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This paper examines the effect of international trade on intra-national distribution of 
income. The empirical validity of any such linkage (between trade-GDP ratio and Gini coefficient 
of income inequality) is tested in an instrumental variable estimation of cross-country regressions. 
There are three main findings from a sample of 73 countries in 1985. First, greater participation in 
trade significantly reduces income inequality. Second, the strong negative association between 
trade and inequality does not arise because countries that have a more egalitarian distribution of 
income for reasons other than trade engage in more trade. Third, growth provides a channel 





In the 1980s the U.S. as well as many other OECD economies experienced an 
increasing “wage” inequality between “skill”-types (whether reported as declining relative 
wages of unskilled laborers in the U.S. or their rising unemployment in Western Europe).
1 
The rising wage inequality coincided with a continued expansion of global trade.
2 This 
observation has generated a wide range of studies exploring the relationship between trade 
and wage inequality. This paper approaches a related yet distinct question: Does international 
trade cause inequality in the intra-national distribution of income? In other words, but for the 
opportunity to trade how different would a country’s income distribution be? 
In the U.S., approximately 47% of total household income goes to the richest 20% and 
the poorest 20% receives about 3.8%. During the 1980s, the proportion of total household 
income going to the richest 20% rose from 43.9% to 46.2% while that received by the 
poorest 20% fell from 4.2% to 3.8%.
3 Studies of other countries have also discovered a 
general tendency toward rising inequality. An OECD report
4 revealed that during the 1980s 
income inequality increased in 12 out of the 17 countries studied. The increases were 
particularly large in the U.K. and the U.S. while in Germany inequality declined. The ratio of 
the 9
th to the 5
th richest 10% households rose in all 12 countries except Netherlands and 
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Sweden while the ratio of the 1
st to the 5
th poorest 10% fell in 8 of the countries.
5 The 
general increase in inequality has occurred at a time of increased globalization, or integration, 
of the world economy, with international trade growing more rapidly than world output. This 
makes the question addressed in this paper particularly interesting as the debate on the late 
20
th century globalization and inequality connection stands unresolved while some think that 
trade accounted for a third to a half rise in inequality in the U.S. and other OECD countries 
in the 1980s. 
The goal of this paper is not to examine the causes of changes in relative wages for any 
particular country or group of countries over time. Instead, the empirical validity of the 
causal relationship between trade-GDP ratio and Gini coefficient of income inequality is 
tested in a cross-country regression analysis. An answer to this question may be of more 
interest, from the point of view of a country’s welfare, than an analysis of the role of trade in 
the dismal real wage performance for the less skilled. It is not entirely clear that a greater 
wage inequality among the skilled and the unskilled, though a worrying phenomenon with 
important social, political as well as economic implications, lowers welfare. However, it is 
well known that a country’s social  welfare ( SW) is a decreasing function of its Gini 
coefficient (G) of income inequality:  ) 1 /( G SW + =m ￿where  m is the mean income of a 
country’s population.
6 
The three main findings of this paper are: 
1. Greater participation in trade significantly reduces income inequality: on an average a 
percentage point increase in a country’s trade-GDP ratio is expected to lower its Gini 
coefficient of inequality by 0.18%. 
2. The strong negative association between trade and inequality does not arise because 
countries that have a more egalitarian distribution of income for reasons other than trade 
engage in more trade. 
3. Growth provides a channel through which trade lowers inequality by raising both initial 
income and subsequent growth. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief review of the 
literature on the relationship between international trade and inequality. Section III describes 
the data and estimation technique used in the empirical analysis. Section IV presents the 
results. Section V explores if growth provides a channel through which trade influences 
inequality. Section VI summarizes the conclusions of the paper. 
 
II. The Literature 
 
After 1973 and especially in the 1980’s, the US experienced a dismal real wage 
performance for the less skilled, mostly due to declining productivity growth coupled with 
increasing wage inequality between skills. The ratio of weekly wages of the top decile to the 
bottom decile increased from 2.9 in 1963 to 4.4 in 1989 (Kosters (1994)). The gap between 
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wages paid to skilled workers and wages paid to unskilled workers rose by 18 percentage 
points between 1973 and 1995. The same inequality trends were apparent elsewhere in the 
OECD in the 1980s (OECD Employment Outlook (1993)). The debate over explanations for 
these inequality facts started with the observation that the rising inequality coincided with 
expanding international trade. 
The evidence is mixed. Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992) focused exclusively on the 
phenomenon of increasing wage inequality in the U.S. labor market and estimated that 15% 
of the decline in relative wage of high school dropouts to all other workers in the U.S. was 
due to forces of globalization, one-third of which was due to trade. The increase in wage 
inequality that is attributed to international trade, in similar studies with a focus on the U.S. 
labor market, ranges from 5% to 30%. Technology, raising the demand for skilled workers 
faster than supply, has been identified as the other major factor responsible for the increasing 
inequality (Krugman and Lawrence (1994)). Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) dismissed any 
role of trade in the U.S. wage inequality based on their observation that relative prices of 
traded goods produced with comparatively large inputs of unskilled labor rose in the 1980s.   
Several analyses,
7 based on factor content of trade, failed to detect a strong correlation 
between trade and inequality. Wood (1994) argued that these studies grossly underestimated 
the impact of trade on income distribution by making the unrealistic assumption that the 
labor content of goods imported by advanced countries from developing countries is 
identical to that of similar goods produced in the advanced countries. With necessary 
corrections in the measurement of unskilled labor, he estimated that trade has caused the 
relative demand for unskilled labor in the advanced countries to go down by 20% over three 
decades (1970-1990) with most of the shift taking place in the 1980s and concluded that this 
shift was the main cause of the inequality during the 1980s.   
On a sample of 48 countries Fieleke (1994) observed no significant relationship 
between openness and income distribution in the 1980s. Edwards (1997) observed that 
ordinary least squares estimates (of a multivariate equation) from a sample of 44 countries in 
the 1980s indicate no significant relationship between openness and income distribution. 
 
III. Model, Data and Estimation 
 
A critical problem in estimating trade’s impact on income distribution is that a 
regression of some measure of income inequality on some measure of trade (and other 
variables) does not imply any causality because trade itself is endogenous. Countries that 
have an unequal distribution of income for reasons other than trade may choose to trade more 
(based on the principle of comparative advantage). For instance, a country that has a skewed 
distribution of income because agricultural workers are paid relatively less than industrial 
workers will gain from trading with (exporting agricultural products to and importing 
industrial products from) a country that pays its industrial workers relatively less than 
agricultural workers. Putting prices rather than quantities on the right hand side does not 
provide a solution because international prices may be endogenous as well. Even for a small 
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open economy, the but for interpretation of the question at hand requires the assumption that 
trade policy could be used to hold prices constant and that need not be true. Focusing on 
trade policies (and/or a variety of measures of openness) rather than trade does not remove 
the problem either. The parameters of trade policy may be endogenous in a political economy 
context that becomes particularly important in any discussion of income distribution.   
Another associated problem arises from the inclusion of multiple variables in a 
regression of income inequality on trade. Once variables other than trade (technology, age 
composition, natural resources, education supply, immigration, organization of the work 
force etc.) are included in the list of explanatory variables the but for interpretation of the 
question at hand becomes less clear. When an endogenous measure of trade enters as an 
explanatory variable along with other exogenous variables that could themselves affect the 
measure of trade then separate roles of all explanatory variables are intertwined and become 
difficult to interpret. For instance, a difference in technology across countries can result in a 
more or less equitable distribution of income within each country but the same difference can 
affect each country’s trade. When technology is identified as a separate explanatory variable 
does it mean that the effect of trade is being considered under the assumption that there are 
no differences in technology or that the effect of technology is being considered under the 
assumption that there are no differences in trade? If both of these, then what can be said 
about the effect of trade when technology is allowed to be different?   
To address these problems this paper uses an instrument for trade, based on countries’ 
geographic characteristics (size and proximity), recently developed by Frankel and Romer 
(1999). While the empirical literature on gravity models of trade
8 reflect that geography is a 
powerful determinant of bilateral trade Frankel and Romer have shown that the same is true 
for countries’ overall trade. For instance, the distance of New Zealand from most other 
countries dampens its trade and the proximity of Belgium to many of the world’s most 
populous countries increases its trade. At the same time a country’s proximity to others is not 
affected by its distribution of income or by other factors that can influence the distribution of 
income. In general, it is difficult to reason that a country’s geographic characteristics can 
have any effect on its distribution of income other than through their impact on its trade. This 
makes the use of an instrumental variable based on a country’s geographic characteristics 
(namely, size and proximity) a meaningful one in the context of estimating the effect of trade 
on its income distribution.   
The basic idea behind the empirical analysis in this paper can be summarized using a 
simple two-equation model. First, the average income inequality in country  i  is a function 
of international trade and other factors: 
 
t i i T G e b a + + = .                                                    (1) 
 
Here  i  is used to index countries,  i G  is a measure of intra-country income inequality,  i T  
is a measure of international trade and  t e   captures other influences on its income inequality. 
Second, a country’s international trade is a function of its proximity to other countries 
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and its size: 
 
t i i i P S T n f d g + + + = .                                                (2) 
 
Here  i S   measures country i’s size,  i P   is a measure of its proximity to other countries and 
t n   captures other influences on its international trade. 
Cross-country regressions of income inequality (measured by Gini coefficients) on 
international trade are estimated by Instrumental Variable (IV) method using Frankel and 
Romer’s constructed trade-GDP ratio as an instrument. The constructed trade-GDP ratio 
) (t  is a series of values of trade-GDP ratio predicted by an equation that takes the form of 
(2). Frankel and Romer calculated this series for 150 countries in 1985 by regressing 
countries’ actual trade-GDP ratio  ) (T , measured by the ratio of value of trade to GDP, on 
their size (based on area and population) and proximity (based on distance, land-locking and 
border-sharing).   
The residuals in the two equations,  t e  and  t n ,  may be correlated. For instance, a 
country’s infrastructure or its government policies toward competition are likely to affect its 
international trade as well as its income distribution. But that does not pose any problem for 
IV estimation. The rationale behind employing Frankel and Romer’s constructed trade-GDP 
ratio as the instrumental variable rests on three essential facts: 
i) Frankel and Romer report that countries’ constructed trade-GDP ratio is significantly 
correlated with the actual trade-GDP ratio. The magnitude of the (positive) correlation is 
in the order of 0.62. A regression of  T  on  t  yields a coefficient of 0.99 with a 
t-statistic of 9.5. This means that c onstructed trade-GDP ratios contain sufficient 
information about actual trade for IV estimation. 
ii) Results from Staiger and Stock (1997), Hall, Rudebusch, and Wilcox (1996), and Nelson 
and Startz (1990) imply that the  F-statistic
9 is too large for any finite-sample bias of 
instrumental variables to be a serious problem in the IV estimation. 
iii) Countries’ geographic characteristics (Si’s and Pi’s) are unlikely to be correlated with the 
residual  ) ( t e   in Equation (1). A country’s size and proximity to other countries are not 
affected by its distribution of income or by other factors, such as government policies, 
that can affect the distribution of income. It is also difficult to imagine how a country’s 
size and proximity to other countries can affect the factors that determine its distribution 
of income in any meaningful way other than through their impact on international trade. 
Finally, there has always been a concern about the lack of dependable data on income 
distribution.
10 The World B ank has recently published a data set on income distribution 
(based on the work of Deininger and Squire (1996)). This presents the most comprehensive
11 
data available on income distribution. This paper uses the Gini coefficients for 1985 reported 
 
9. See Table 1. 
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in this data set as a measure of countries’ income inequality. 
In short, the empirical analysis involves instrumental variables estimation of the effect 
of international trade on intra-national income inequality based on a sample containing 
observations on trade-GDP ratios (actual and constructed) from Frankel and Romer (1999) 
and Gini coefficients
12 from World Development Indicators (1998), for 73 countries in 1985. 
The sample spans 18 low-income, 22 lower middle-income, 9 higher middle-income and 24 
high-income countries.
13 The complete data set is reported along with descriptive statistics 




The results are presented in this section. Estimates from IV and OLS estimation of the 
log-linear version of Equation (1) are reported in Table 1. Column (1) is an OLS regression 
of the logarithm of Gini coefficient of inequality on a constant and the log of actual 
trade-GDP ratio. Column (2) reports IV estimation of the same equation treating trade-GDP 
ratio as endogenous and using the log of constructed trade-GDP ratio as an instrument. 
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot and the fitted lines: the steeper line corresponds to IV 
estimation and the flatter to OLS estimation. 
 
Table 1   Inequality and Trade 
  (1)  (2) 




  (19.07)  (16.06) 
log(Trade-GDP ratio)  ꎭ0.12
**  ꎭ0.18
*** 
  (ꎭ2.15)  (ꎭ2.66) 
5% Confidence Interval (log Trade-GDP Ratio)  [ꎭ0.22,  ꎭ0.01]  [ꎭ0.32,  ꎭ0.05] 
Sample size  73  73 
Adjusted R
2  0.06  0.04 
Std. Error of Regression  0.113  0.114 
F-statistic on excluded instrument    7.09 
Notes: The dependent variable is log of Gini coefficient of inequality; t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
** indicates that the corresponding coefficient is significant at 5% level. 
*** indicates that the corresponding coefficient is significant at 1% level. 
 
 
12. Two alternative measures of inequality were considered: a) the ratio of income earned by the top quartile to 
income earned by the bottom quartile, and b) percentage of income to the highest 20% of the population. The 
results are similar. The results reported in this paper are those based on the Gini coefficient of inequality since 
more observations are available on this measure. 
13. The classification follows the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), 1998. CHAKRABARTI: DOES TRADE CAUSE INEQUALITY? 
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Figure 1   Inequality and Trade 
 
The following inferences are drawn from Table 1. First, the regressions show a 
statistically significant inverse relationship between trade and income inequality. In other 
words, greater participation in trade significantly reduces income inequality. Variation in 
countries’ trade-GDP ratio explains approximately 4% of the variation in countries’ 
Gini-coefficients of income inequality. The point estimate (in column 2) indicates that an 
increase in a country’s trade-GDP ratio by one percent is, on an average, expected to lower 
its Gini-coefficient of inequality by 0.18%. The absolute value of the true parameter is 
expected to range between 0.05 and 0.32 with 95% level of confidence. Second, the fact that 
the magnitude of the IV estimate is greater than that of the OLS estimate indicates that OLS 
understates the effect of trade on inequality. Under the null hypothesis that the OLS and IV 
estimates are equal, the difference between the two estimates divided by the standard error of 
the difference is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variable. The hypothesis that 
the IV and OLS estimates are equal is rejected (the  t-statistic is 1.58) at 10% level of 
significance. That is, the strong negative association between trade and inequality does not 
arise because countries that have a more egalitarian distribution of income for reasons other 
than trade engage in more trade. 
The results are robust to the following alterations in model specification and 
information-set.   
First, MacKinnon’s extended J test (PE test) is used to verify whether a linear 
specification provides a better fit to the data than does a log-linear specification or the other 
way round. The tests were inconclusive on either count (the  t-statistic for t he test of 
superiority of linear over log-linear specification is ꎭ0.47 and of log-linear over linear is JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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1.39) indicating that neither specification is superior to the other.
14 In column (1) of Table 2, 
I report the results from an OLS regression of the logarithm of the Gini coefficient of 
inequality on a constant and the logarithm of actual trade-GDP ratio. Column (2) is an IV 
estimation of the same equation treating the logarithm of trade-GDP ratio as endogenous and 
using the logarithm of constructed trade-GDP ratio as an instrument. The statistically 
significant inverse relationship between trade and income inequality is maintained in the 
linear model.
15 For ease of comparison the results reported in the rest of the paper are all 
based on a log-linear specification. 
 
Table 2  Inequality and Trade (log-linear vs. linear specification) 
Specification  log-linear  linear 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 






  (19.07)  (16.06)  (22.95)  (23.69) 





  (ꎭ2.15)  (ꎭ2.66)  (ꎭ3.99)  (ꎭ4.58) 
Sample size  73  73  73  73 
Adjusted R
2  0.06  0.04  0.0794  0.0791 
Std. Error of Regression  0.113  0.114  9.527  9.528 
 
Second, Luxembourg (the observation on the extreme right of Figure 1) is detected as 
the single outlier. The results from dropping this observation are compared in Table 3. The 
IV estimate is larger but is less precisely estimated (with a standard error of 0.034) without 
Luxembourg in the sample than with it. 
 
Table 3  Inequality and Trade (outlier) 
Sample  all 73 countries   Luxembourg excluded 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 






  (19.07)  (16.06)  (17.98)  (14.76) 





  (ꎭ2.15)  (ꎭ2.66)  (ꎭ1.88)  (ꎭ2.41) 
Sample size  73  73  72  72 
Adjusted R
2  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.03 
Std. Error of Regression  0.113  0.114  0.114  0.115 
 
 
14. For ease of comparison and interpretation the results reported in the rest of the paper are all based on a log-linear 
specification. 
15. The results reported in this paper are based on the log-linear specification. The linear model generates 
qualitatively similar results. See Chakrabarti (2000). CHAKRABARTI: DOES TRADE CAUSE INEQUALITY? 
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Third, there may be a concern that systematic differences among countries at varying 
levels of development are driving the results. That is, it could be that the IV estimate of the 
impact of trade arises because countries in certain income-groups have systematically lower 
constructed trade-GDP ratio given their levels of development a nd that they also have 
systematically unequal distribution of income. If this were true, then the results could be 
driven not by trade but by other features of those income-groups. To address this concern, 
the regressions are re-estimated using a dummy variable for each income-group.   
 
Table 4  Inequality and Trade 
(income-groups: low & lower middle-income and high & higher middle-income) 
Specification  without dummy variables  with dummy variables 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Estimation  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
log(Trade-GDP ratio)  ꎭ0.12
**  ꎭ0.18
***  ꎭ0.08  ꎭ0.16
** 
  (ꎭ2.15)  (ꎭ2.66)  (ꎭ1.49)  (ꎭ2.30) 
Constant  1.75
***  1.87
***     
  (19.07)  (16.06)     
D1 = 1 for low & lower middle-
income countries 






= 0 otherwise      (18.84)  (16.03) 
D2 = 1 for high & higher middle-
income countries 






= 0 otherwise      (16.61)  (14.27) 
Sample size  73  73  73  73 
Adjusted R
2  0.06  0.04  0.995  0.999 
Std. Error of Regression  0.113  0.114  0.110  0.112 
 
In Table 4 the estimates are presented with two dummy variables: one for high and 
higher middle-income and the other for low and lower middle-income countries. While the 
OLS estimate loses its significance, the magnitude of the IV estimate drops only marginally 
maintaining the statistically significant inverse relationship between trade and income 
inequality throughout.
16 Thus there is no evidence that systematic differences among 
income-groups are important in the results. 
Fourth, a concern about the (economic) quality (although the statistical properties
17 
are impressive) of the instrument, may stem from the observation that income is an important 
determinant of trade. The instrument employed here was constructed by Frankel and Romer 
(1999), on the basis of a “pure geography” approach using a country’s geographic characteristics, 
namely, size and proximity. The regressions are re-estimated with an alternative instrument 
 
16. Similar results are obtained when a) three dummy variables (for high-income, middle-income and low-income 
countries) are introduced and b) the measure of openness is interacted with the dummy variables for income 
groups. See Chakrabarti (2000). 
17. See Section III. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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that was constructed, by Frankel and Romer (1996), on the basis of a “factor accumulation” 
approach using information on physical and human capital accumulation and population 
growth (as determinants of income) in addition to size and proximity. The results are 
compared in Table 5. The IV estimate is larger but is less precisely estimated (with a 
standard error of 0.079) with the instrument based on factor accumulation. 
 
Table 5  Inequality and Trade (choice of instrument) 
Choice of Instrument  None  Pure Geography  Factor Accumulation 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 





  (19.07)  (16.06)  (16.04) 




  (ꎭ2.15)  (ꎭ2.66)  (ꎭ4.38) 
Sample size  73  73  73 
Adjusted R
2  0.06  0.04  0.03 
Std. Error of Regression  0.113  0.114  0.126 
 
Fifth, as a general check of potential data problems, I use the Penn World Table’s 
summary assessments of the quality of countries’ data to exclude the countries with the 
poorest data from the sample. Specifically, only countries that are assigned a grade better 
than “D” on the basis of the quality of data are included. The results are presented in 
columns (3) and (4) of Table  6. The change in sample size and composition affects the 
estimates only marginally. An alternative sample is also considered from which major 
oil-producing countries are excluded because the bulk of their recorded growth comes from 
extraction of existing resources, not value added. The results are presented in columns (5) 
and (6) of Table  7. While the OLS estimate loses its significance the IV estimate remains 
significantly negative. 
 
Table 6  Inequality and Trade (data quality) 





(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 








  (19.07)  (16.06)  (18.94)  (16.25)  (16.29)  (13.58) 




**  ꎭ0.09  ꎭ0.18
** 
  (ꎭ2.15)  (ꎭ2.66)  (ꎭ2.53)  (ꎭ2.99)  (ꎭ1.54)  (ꎭ2.22) 
Sample size  73  73  64  64  69  69 
Adjusted R
2  0.06  0.04  0.08  0.07  0.05  0.03 
Std. Error of Regression  0.113  0.114  6.42  8.95  9.78  9.87 
 
Finally, I turn to the possibility that the estimated coefficient of the log of trade-GDP CHAKRABARTI: DOES TRADE CAUSE INEQUALITY? 
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ratio can be sensitive to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables.
18 The additional 
explanatory variables ( Z-variables) considered are age composition (Z1), education supply 
(Z2), and relative demand for skilled workers (Z3). An Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) is 
used to test the fragility of the estimated coefficient.
19 The EBA involves alterations in the 
subset of Z-variables to find the widest range of coefficient estimates on the variable of 
interest (trade-GDP ratio). The  extreme upper bound (EUB) is defined by the group of 
Z-variables that produces the maximum value in terms of the estimated coefficient of the 
trade-GDP ratio plus two standard deviations. The extreme lower bound (ELB) is defined by 
the group of  Z-variables that produces the minimum value in terms of the estimated 
coefficient of the trade-GDP ratio minus two standard deviations. The fraction of population 
aged 40-64 is used as a proxy for the labor in peak earning years to capture the effect of age 
composition on inequality. The fraction of population aged 25 and up having complete 
secondary or higher education is used as measure of education supply. Services production 
as a proportion of GDP is used as an indicator of the relative demand for skilled workers.
20 
The results are presented in Table 7. The estimates maintain a statistically significant inverse 
relationship between trade and income inequality. 
The results consistently reflect a statistically significant inverse relationship between 
trade and income inequality and are thus distinct from those reported in related literature.
21 
The neutral evidences of Fieleke (1994) and Edwards (1997) may be attributed to the 
endogenous nature of the trade variable included in their regressions. Wood’s (1994) finding, 
while distinct from other factor content studies, can be subjected to the criticism that he 
assumes that advanced countries use the same technology as the developing countries to 




18. It may be noted that the argument behind using Frankel and Romer’s instrument based on geographic 
characteristics implies that there is a priori no strong reason to expect additional independent determinants to be 
correlated with the instrument.   
19. The logic of the EBA runs as follows. Suppose a regression involves a set of variables that are always kept in the 
equation (the free  variables) and some others that the researcher feels comfortable experimenting with (the 
doubtful variables). Normally, this experimentation is limited to a small subset of the possible models that could 
have been estimated. Instead a meaningful analysis should consider a whole range of models in each of which 
the free variables and any one linear combination of the doubtful variables are included. If it turns out that 
inferences about issues of interest are essentially the same, in the sense that the estimates fall within a reasonable 
range, for all choices of the linear combinations of the doubtful variables, then there need be no debate. If, on the 
other hand, the range turns out to be too wide then it must be admitted that the inferences are too fragile to be 
useful. The intuition for considering all linear combinations of the doubtful variables is that this represents all 
(linear) constraints that can be imposed, the most familiar constraint obviously being the exclusion of a variable 
by setting its coefficient to zero. See Leamer (1985, 1983) and Chakrabarti (1999, 1998) for a thorough 
discussion on EBA. 
20. The data is extracted from the WDI, 1998. 
21. See Section II. 
22. See Golub (1994). He identified sizeable and persistent gaps even between the advanced countries in both labor 
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Table 7  Inequality and Trade (EBA) 
Estimate  b  TSE  # of countries  Adj. R-sq.  Z-variables 
  MAX  ꎭ0.17
**  0.051  58  0.24  logZ2 
OLS  BASE  ꎭ0.12
**  0.046  73  0.06   
  MIN  ꎭ0.10
**  0.043  54  0.27  logZ1, logZ2, logZ3 
  MAX  ꎭ0.21
***  0.061  58  0.11  logZ2 
IV  BASE  ꎭ0.18
***  0.057  73  0.04   
  MIN  ꎭ0.13
***  0.054  54  0.17  logZ1, logZ2, logZ3 
Notes: The base b is the coefficient of log(trade-GDP ratio). The MAX refers to the estimated b from the regression 
yielding the EUB and the MIN refers to the estimated b from the regression yielding the ELB, identified 
from the set of regressions run by permuting the subset of  Z-variables. 
 
In some sense the observations of Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), despite their 
exclusive focus on the phenomenon of increasing wage-inequality in the U.S. labor market 
and dismissal of any role of trade in it, can be interpreted to be consistent with my results. 
They observed that relative prices of traded goods produced with comparatively large inputs 
of unskilled labor rose in the 1980s. Conventional wisdom (Stolper-Samuelson theorem) 
suggests that if trade is to be held responsible for a relatively high reward to skilled labor one 
should have observed, instead, a decline in the relative prices of goods with relatively large 
content of unskilled labor. Therefore, if anything, trade must have, through a movement in 
relative prices, had a dampening effect on wage inequality in the U.S. during the 1980s. 
 
V. Trade, Growth, and Inequality 
 
Having observed that international trade reduces inequality it is important to examine 
how it does so. To shed some light on this issue let us turn to a long-established empirical 
regularity (due originally to Nicholas Kaldor and Simon Kuznets): there is a tendency for 
income inequality to worsen at early stages of growth and then improve at later stages. A 
common interpretation of this phenomenon is that income redistribution is a “superior good” 
that societies choose to purchase more of, even though at some cost to aggregate income, as 
they grow rich enough to be able to afford to do so. A large number of empirical studies have 
repeatedly confirmed a trade-off between growth and inequality.
23 At the same time from 
Adam Smith’s discussion of specialization and the ex tent of the market, to the debates about 
import substitution versus export-led growth, to recent works on increasing returns and 
endogenous technological progress economists have argued that countries gain from trade. 
Frankel and Romer (1999) have convincingly demonstrated that trade has a quantitatively 
large, significant and robust positive effect on per-capita income. 
One distinct possibility is then that trade lowers inequality by raising income. If 
growth enters into the analytical framework in this fashion then, in addition to Equations (1) 
 
and total factor productivity by industry indicating significant technological differences across countries. 
23. For recent works in the area see Deininger and Squire (1998), Perotti (1996), Clarke (1995), and Persson and 
Tabellini (1994). CHAKRABARTI: DOES TRADE CAUSE INEQUALITY? 
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and (2), the model will include an equation that expresses income of a country can as a 
function of international trade and other factors: 
 
t i i T Y w q h + + = .                                                     (3) 
 
Here  i Y  is income per person in country  i  and  t w  captures other influences on its 
income. Data on income per person, measured by real GDP per worker at 1985 international 
prices (dollars), is extracted from Penn World Table, Mark 5.6. The hypothesis that growth 
provides a channel through which trade lowers inequality, is evaluated in the following steps. 
First, the log-linear version of Equation ( 3) is estimated by IV method, using the 
constructed trade-GDP ratios as instruments, to obtain the vector of predicted per-capita 
income (
￿
Y log ) that measures the component of per-capita income explained by trade. Then 
log i G  is regressed on 
￿
Y log . 
 
Table 8  Trade, Income, and Inequality 
(1)  (2)  Instrument 




  (5.91)  (12.20) 
￿
Y log   ꎭ0.22
**  ꎭ0.08
** 
  (ꎭ2.15)  (ꎭ2.15) 
5% Confidence Interval (
￿
Y log )  [ꎭ0.43,  ꎭ0.02]  [ꎭ0.16,  ꎭ0.01] 
Sample size  73  73 
Adjusted R
2  0.06  0.06 
Std. Error of Regression  0.113  0.113 
Note: The dependent variable is log of Gini coefficient of inequality. 
 
Table 8 reports the results: column (1) describes the regression of log i G  on 
￿
Y log  
corresponding to the “pure geography” based instrument and column (2) describes the same 
regression corresponding to the “factor accumulation” based instrument. In either case the 
coefficient of 
￿
Y log  is significantly negative reflecting that an important mechanism through 
which trade lowers inequality is by raising income. 
Second, following Frankel and Romer (1999), per-capita income is decomposed into 
two components (initial income and subsequent growth): 
 
] ) log( ) [log( ) log( ) log( 1960 1985 1960 1985 i i i i Y Y Y Y - + = .                             (4) 
 
Here the log of output per worker in 1985 ( 1985 ) log( i Y ) is expressed as the sum of its value at 
the beginning of the sample ( 1960 ) log( i Y ) and the change over the sample period 
]) ) log( ) [log( log ( 1960 1985 i i i Y Y Y - = D . Each component of income is regressed on trade-shares, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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using the constructed trade-GDP ratios as instruments, to obtain vectors of predicted initial 
income (
￿
1960 ) log(Y ) and of subsequent growth (
￿
D Y log ). These vectors measure the 
respective components of initial income and of subsequent growth explained by trade. Then 
log  i G  is regressed on each of these components. 
 
Table 9  Trade, Components of Income, and Inequality 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  Instrument 






  (5.78)  (11.56)  (18.11)  (31.54) 
￿
1960 ) log(Y   ꎭ0.32
**  ꎭ0.11
**     
  (ꎭ2.46)  (ꎭ2.46)     
￿
D Y log       ꎭ0.86
**  ꎭ0.45
** 
      (ꎭ2.46)  (ꎭ2.46) 
Sample size  70  70  70  70 
Adjusted R
2  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08 
Std. Error of Regression  0.109  0.109  0.109  0.109 
Notes: The dependent variable is log of Gini coefficient of inequality. 
The sample size is smaller because decomposition was not possible for Bulgaria, Poland and Soviet Union 
due to lack of data on Real GDP in 1960 (at 1985 International Prices) for these countries. 
 
Table 9 reports the results: columns (1) and (2) describe the regression of log  i G  on 
￿
1960 ) log(Y  and columns (3) and (4) describe the regression of log  i G  on  , log
￿
D Y  corresponding 
to the “pure geography” and “factor accumulation” based instruments respectively. The 
significantly negative coefficients of 
￿
1960 ) log(Y  and 
￿
D Y log  indicate that trade lowers 
inequality by raising both initial income and subsequent growth. 
Finally, a distinct question is posed: does growth have a role in lowering inequality 
that is independent of international trade? 
 
Table 10  Trade, Growth, and Inequality 





  (15.72)  (14.97)  (13.97) 
log(Per-capita Income)  ꎭ0.09
***  ꎭ0.05  ꎭ0.01 
  (ꎭ2.97)  (ꎭ1.51)  (ꎭ0.32) 
log(Trade-GDP ratio)    ꎭ0.15
**  ꎭ0.33
*** 
    (ꎭ2.08)  (ꎭ3.58) 
Sample size  73  73  73 
Adjusted R
2  0.09  0.09  0.09 
Std. Error of Regression  0.110  0.111  0.125 
Notes: The dependent variable is log of Gini coefficient of inequality. CHAKRABARTI: DOES TRADE CAUSE INEQUALITY? 
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Table 10 reports the results. Column (1) describes the regression of log  i G  on the log 
of per-capita income. Columns (2) and (3) describe regressions of log  i G  on the log of 
per-capita  income as well as log of trade-GDP ratio using instruments based on “pure 
geography” and “factor accumulation” respectively. The coefficient of log of per-capita 
income is negative and highly significant in the first regression but loses its significance 
when log of trade-GDP ratio is added as an explanatory variable. This provides evidence that 
growth does not have a role in lowering inequality that is independent of trade. In other 
words, the growth-inequality trade-off is driven by the dampening effect that international 




In this paper I have investigated the effect of international trade on intra-national 
distribution of income. During the 1980s the distribution of income had become less equal 
than ever in a large number of countries all over the world. At the same time international 
trade had intensified. The merit of international trade has been hotly debated in this light. 
Conclusive evidence has not yet emerged in a form that can enable one to take a strong 
position on either side of the debate. Empirical analyses of the link between trade and 
income distribution become particularly challenging because of the endogenous nature of 
trade. This problem has been addressed in this paper by estimating the relationship between 
countries’ Gini coefficient of inequality and trade-GDP ratio using instruments based on 
countries’ geographic characteristics (size and proximity) and factor accumulation (physical 
and human capital accumulation and population growth). The results from a sample of 73 
countries in 1985 indicate a robust and statistically significant inverse relationship between 
trade and income inequality. Greater participation in international trade reduces inequality in 
the intra-national distribution of income. The strong negative association between trade and 
inequality can not be attributed to the possibility that countries with a more egalitarian 
distribution of income for reasons other than trade engage in more trade. Finally, growth 
provides a channel through which trade lowers inequality by raising both initial income and 
subsequent growth. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Appendix I 
 
Distribution of Household Income in the 1980s 
 
Distribution of Household Income
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Distribution of Household Income: Continued


































































Source: World Development Indicators (1998). 
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Appendix II : Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Data 










Algeria  38.73  49.66  13.97  12.51 
Argentina  42.00  17.10  5.60  5.97 
Australia  37.58  35.28  4.07  5.14 
Austria  28.94  81.27  36.64  56.95 
Bangladesh  37.00  25.78  10.31  8.55 
Barbados  31.10  130.30  56.10  38.63 
Belgium  26.22  151.34  52.46  77.66 
Bolivia  51.57  30.27  8.06  7.79 
Brazil  59.54  19.34  3.03  3.31 
Bulgaria  23.42  85.99  31.12  45.96 
Cameroon  49.00  57.67  15.79  6.50 
Canada  32.81  54.48  4.97  8.05 
Chile  53.20  53.85  7.25  7.70 
China  31.40  19.44  2.30  4.49 
Colombia  44.70  26.33  7.54  7.43 
Costa Rica  41.80  63.19  23.37  15.07 
Czechoslovakia  19.86  69.45  21.07  39.58 
Denmark  20.10  72.99  30.89  56.68 
Dom. Rep.  43.29  64.24  22.37  13.75 
Egypt    34.00  51.97  11.75  10.32 
Ethiopia  32.42  34.13  8.44  3.41 
Finland  20.00  57.50  21.64  41.09 
France  34.91  47.17  15.26  28.94 
Germany  26.00  61.52  18.47  34.46 
Ghana  35.90  21.29  18.87  8.87 
Greece  35.19  53.97  27.01  38.98 
Honduras  54.94  54.15  27.58  10.56 
India  32.22  15.04  3.29  4.68 
Indonesia  32.40  42.66  4.47  5.01 
Iran  42.90  15.20  10.06  10.96 
Ireland  34.60  118.84  33.85  54.49 
Israel  37.71  85.80  54.17  41.99 
Italy  33.58  46.06  13.97  26.92 
Japan  35.90  25.54  5.47    14.41 
Jordan  31.70  113.50  68.18  39.46 
Kenya  57.30  51.69  12.48  5.94 
Korea, R.  34.54  67.86  14.36  28.18 
Luxembourg  27.13  211.94  281.29  235.01 
Madagascar  48.90  30.99  9.9  3.56 CHAKRABARTI: DOES TRADE CAUSE INEQUALITY? 
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Data (Continued) 










Malawi  59.90  54.09  12.67  3.83 
Mexico  50.58  25.74  4.52  5.55 
Morocco  39.70  58.50  12.71  9.95 
Nepal  30.06  31.29  13.26  9.23 
Netherlands  29.10  118.76  35.84  63.30 
New Zealand  35.82  65.25  8.19  9.98 
Nigeria  37.02  28.53  8.68  5.22 
Norway  31.39  86.00  23.54  41.23 
Pakistan  32.44  34.00  8.04  6.54 
Panama  56.47  70.96  23.56  18.17 
Paraguay  45.10  49.58  10.43  7.80 
Peru  42.76  39.42  7.03  7.56 
Philippines  46.08  45.84  8.84  14.64 
Poland  25.27  35.07  13.84  28.80 
Portugal  36.80  77.95  18.78  27.32 
Romania  23.38  41.62  18.80  32.10 
Rwanda  28.90  30.65  26.20  4.67 
South Africa  51.00  55.43  8.90  4.76 
Soviet Union  25.62  18.28  3.68  7.71 
Spain  25.19  43.51  12.38  21.43 
Sri Lanka  46.70  62.93  13.94  15.08 
Sweden  31.24  69.02  18.22  32.41 
Switzerland  37.37  77.69  32.57  48.85 
Taiwan  29.20  94.62  17.92  27.19 
Tanzania  53.00  21.03  10.97  2.84 
Thailand  47.40  51.20  9.45  9.44 
Tunisia  43.00  71.33  23.83  20.64 
Turkey  44.09  44.40  11.26  15.37 
Uganda  33.00  22.54  12.97  3.76 
UK  27.10  56.87  13.47  22.54 
Uruguay  41.72  47.86  17.07  15.52 
USA  37.26  18.01  2.56  5.22 
Venezuela  45.17  40.76  8.94  7.82 
Yugoslavia  32.40  57.88  25.82  42.93 
Notes: Gini Coefficient = Gini coefficient of income inequality in 1985 (World Development Indicators (1998)); 
Actual Trade-GDP Ratio = Ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, 1985 (Penn World Table, Mark 5.6, 
Series: OPEN). Constructed Trade-GDP Ratio (Pure Geography) = Aggregate fitted values of bilateral trade 
equation with geographic variables (Frankel and Romer (1999)). Constructed Trade-GDP Ratio (Factor 
Accumulation) = Aggregate fitted values of bilateral trade equation with geographic variables, physical and 
human capital accumulation, and population growth (Frankel and Romer (1996)). JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Descriptive Statistics 










Mean  37.48  55.64  20.77  22.85 
Standard Deviation  9.86  33.71  33.57  30.58 
Maximum  59.90  211.94  281.29  235.01 
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